WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE AND YOUNG COL moore had no knoweldge of air assualt tatics,infantry should be changed to fiction

people every where are smitten,with a tale that is written.once a hero's deeds are known thery,re as good as etched in stone. every word folks take to heart and think this makes them very smart amazing how the very wise never stop to reailze that what they read may not be true.  groo        THIS IS NOT MEANT TO DEGRADE THE MEN WHO FOUGHT AND DIED IN THE IA DRANG OR THE OTHER UNITS THAT PUSHED THE PAVN IN TO THE KILLING ZONE. The battle did happen they fought  not knowing their leader after 14 mo traning didn't retained that traning his book clearly demonstrates that he said there were no manuals there are FM 57-35 airmobile operations 1963  page 39-40 moores book.but my main concern focused on the fact that we would have only 16 huey slicks to ferry the battalion into yhe assualt area. an avrage 15 mile one way flight. what that meant was that fewer than 80 men not one full co would hit the lz in the first wave later lifts would carry more .men 90 -100  as they burned off fuel fm 57-35 page 7 paragraph 14 refuling A.the aviation commander is responsible for planing aircraft refuling in coordination with the air mobile commander  B.refuling facilities should be located next to the loading area this permits the aircraft to mantian the higest lift capibilities  normally aircraft carry the mimimum amount of fuel inaddition to the reserve so that they can carry maximum payloads there a lot more mistakes to many to put here. his wepons squad only had m60's he left out the 90mm recolless rifles that are toe to each battalion 2 per platoon albany32@aol.com