

SELF-INTERESTED VOTING VOTE SELLING AND

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Many philosophers as well as ordinary people believe it is morally permissible for citizens of a democracy to vote in their own interest. Yet most believe it is wrong to sell one's vote. The aim of this article is to show that these two propositions are jointly inconsistent. If vote selling is morally wrong, then self-interest voting is also wrong—and wrong nearly to the same degree. My conclusion is the conditional. Those who are predisposed to think selling is wrong, to support their view. On the premise that vote course use the conditional, together with the common good can of voters have a moral obligation to vote for the common good can of selling is wrong, to support their view. On the premise that selling is wrong, with self-interest voting can take the conditional to show that, contrary to what we might have thought, vote selling is morally acceptable as well. David Lewis has pointed out that a philosophical theory is almost never conclusively refuted: "The theory survives its refutation—at a price." The argument presented here identifies a price to be paid for endorsing a theory that implies it is permissible to vote in one's own interest. More generally, the argument shows that those in us who are inclined to believe both propositions (that self-interest is morally acceptable and that vote selling is not) are faced with a puzzle. If we are to regain our reflective equilibrium, we must change our minds about at least one of them.

The issue is whether the actions of vote selling and self-interest ested voting are morally wrong. A separate question is whether either of these ought to be prohibited by law, but that is not my concern here. The type of voting I will discuss is voting by citizens of a democracy—as opposed to voting by, for instance, members of a club or a university department, or by shareholders of a corporation.

The self-interested voter votes for a particular candidate because he believes that the candidate, when elected, will act in a way that furthers his interests. The voter might have arrived at this belief on further basis of either a campaign promise or the candidate's party affiliation or prior record. I shall concentrate on cases of self-interested voting in which the voter casts his ballot as he does because the

Now, given the high likelihood that a single ballot will not make a difference to the outcome of an election, it might be doubted whether voters are in fact ever motivated by their own interests. How can a vote be motivated by self-interest when the voter knows it is very improbable his action will have the effect of furthering his interests? One answer is that an action can be performed with the motive of achieving some end even when the agent knows the end is unlikely to be realized. For example, a person buying a lottery ticket may be motivated by a desire to win the grand prize despite knowing the ticket purchase is very unlikely to have this result. In any case, my conclusion (that self-interest voting is nearly as wrong as vote selling) in no way depends on the claim that voters are in fact motivated by self-interest.

I understand self-interested voting to be voting that is (i) in the voter's interest and not in the common interest and (ii) performed in order to advance the voter's own interest. Performed in order to advance the voter's own interest, Condition (i) implies that voting that in fact serves both the voter's own interest and the common good is not classified as self-interested. In part, this is stipulative. Anyone who is uncomfortable with this stipulation may take my conclusion to be: If vote selling is wrong, then self-interested voting that is not in the common interest is nearly as wrong. Condition (ii) is consistent with our understanding of self-interest. Condition (ii) is consistent with the agent belief that action to count as self-interested action more generally. For an action to count as self-interested, it is not enough that the agent believe the action is in her interest; in addition, the pursuit of her own interest must be what motivates the action.

In outline, the argument is this. There are a number of possible reasons for thinking vote selling is more wrong than self-interested voting. I will argue that among these there are only two that might actually make vote selling morally worse: one is that might involves a contract, the other is that the seller actually brings about the result that he profits.² But neither of these makes more than a very small moral difference. So if vote selling is morally wrong, self-interested voting is not much less wrong.

Self-interested voting and vote selling are thus performed with the same motive. The vote seller votes for a particular candidate in order to receive an economic gain, and the same is true of the self-interested voter. Moreover, in each case this motive overrides at least would override) the voter's judgment about which candidate is superior from the point of view of the common good. The vote seller may judge that some other candidate would better serve the elector-ate, but he votes against this other candidate in order to gain an economic benefit. The same is true of the self-interested voter.

However, the fact that a single vote is unlikely to swing an election means there is a difference between self-interested voting and vote selling that might have some degree of moral weight. The vote seller brings about the result that he makes a monetary gain. He promises to vote in a certain way and thereby causes the voter to pay him. By contrast, because of the low probability that an election will be decided by a single vote, the self-interested voter is unlikely to bring about the result that he makes a monetary gain. He casts his ballot for the purpose of reaping a benefit, and he may well reap the benefit, but it is improbable that his vote caused the benefit to be bestowed on him. This fact (that this vote caused the transfer of money while the self-interested voter is unlikely to do so) suggests there may be a moral difference between self-interested voting and vote selling.

A second difference that might make vote selling somewhat more wrong than self-interested voting is that the vote seller makes at least an informal contract to exchange his vote for money. The contract need not be explicit, just as a sale of a piece of merchandise may not involve an explicit contract. I will now argue that besides these two differences, there are no other morally relevant differences between self-interested voting and vote selling. This will occupy most of the paper. Then I will argue that neither the point about contracts nor the point about causation has much moral weight. That is, neither shows that vote selling is more than slightly worse than self-interested voting. (In speaking this way, I do not wish to imply that either action is morally wrong, but only that if the one is wrong then the other is not much more wrong.) Finally, possible implications of the conclusion will be examined.

What reasons in addition to the points about causation and contract might be offered in favor of the claim that vote selling is morally worse than self-interested voting? We can approach the question by asking

On the second option, the seller has given up the power to vote for the candidate who will in his judgment best serve society as a whole. The vote seller surrenders this power by entering into a contract to vote for the candidate favored by the voter. But now consider the self-interested voter. While he has not given up the power to vote for the candidate who has given up the power to vote for the second option, the voter has given up the opportunity to do so. In voting common good, he has given up the opportunity to do so. In voting his own interest, the self-interested voter thereby loses the opportunity to vote for what he judges to be society's interests. So the difference here is that the voter loses the power to vote for the candidate whom he judges best for the common interest, while the difference here is that the voter loses the power to vote for the candidate whom he judges best for the common interest. So the self-interested voter loses only the opportunity to do so. However, this difference is no more than the difference between being bound and not being bound by a contract. The vote seller, by virtue of the contract into which he has entered with the voter, has lost the power to vote for his judgment of the common good. The self-interested voter, since he is not bound by such a contract, has not lost this power (but he has lost this opportunity).

Thus voter's own interest, then this means best does not make voter sell his morally worse than self-interested voter. And if it means best for the common interest, then there is a difference between voter selling merely loses the opportunity to do so. But this difference is simply the difference between having a certain self-interested voter to vote for the common interest, while the voter sells the power to vote for the common interest beyond the point about contracts.

Another influential ground for criticizing vote selling is that it tends to result in too much political power in the hands of the wealthy.⁵ Let us suppose vote selling does in fact give more political power to the wealthy and this consequence is undesirable from the point of view of the common good. Then we are committed to the view that self-interested voting is wrong. Thus we are concluding that is deleterious to the common good. This is a way of course assuming it is morally wrong to use one's vote in a way that is self-interested that is based on its effects on the community good will serve also to condemn self-interested voting.6

It might be said that the preceding misundestands this objection. To vote selling is not that vote determines the common good, but rather that it goes against the seller's own interests: the economically deprived vote seller in fact acts against his own best interests by trading his vote for money. But again in that case vote selling is not morally wrong but rather imprudent.

Alternatively, it might be claimed that the problem with vote selling is neither that it undermines the common good nor that it works against the interests of the vote seller, but rather that it works against the lower-class voter selling the principle that one ought to vote in one's class interests. However, if this is the explanation of the wrongness of vote selling, it has some peculiar implications. It implies that the rich may morally favor selling his vote to another wealthy person. It also implies that it is wrong for the rich to vote for a policy that favors the poor. Perhaps this last implication could be avoided by altering the principle to say that the lower classes are obliged to vote the principle that this last implication would still have the odd result that poor sellers do wrong while rich ones do not. Moreover, neither version of the class solidarity principle would explain what is wrong with vote buying—since we are assuming that vote buyers tend to be wealthy and that they are furthering their own class interests. Therefore, to the extent that the problem with vote selling is that it tilts the balance of power in favor of the wealthy, vote selling is wrong because of its consequences, not because it violates a principle of class solidarity. But then it follows that self-interested voting is wrong as well.

An objector might instead maintain a different deontological principle according to which it is not that wealth of the buyer or the poverty of the seller that matters; rather, it is just fundamentally wrong to let money influence one's voting. On this view, the vote seller has acted wrongly because he has violated this principle. However, the self-interest voter has also violated this principle. In voting for a candidate for the prospect of monetary gain, the self-interested voter has allowed the prospect of receiving money to influence his vote.

Finally, if the likelihood of profiting is smaller from self-interested voting than from selling, the profit itself will often be larger. Tax reductions to individuals can be quite substantial, while the typical payment for a vote is less than fifty dollars. Considering two cases: one person sells his vote for twenty dollars, and another votes in his own interest knowing, or at least reasonably believing, this likely hood of affecting the outcome is one in one thousand, and the profit

Secondly, consider a case of vote selling in which the voter sells his vote for a check (postdated after the election) that he knows he is rather unlikely to be able to cash. The voter seller knows he didate has a history of writing mostly bad checks for votes; nevertheless he agrees to vote for her on the slight chance of profit-ing, and as it turns out this particular check is good. Because the voter knows the likelihood of profiting from his vote is slim, he does not, according to the objector, vote with the intention of prof-it-ing. Yet this instance of vote selling does not seem morally wrong for that reason; after all, the voter still casts his ballot solely for the chance of monetary gain. Thus the objection is mistaken in claiming the intention to profit makes a moral difference.

In reply, first, imagine the election is extremely close and the voter knows this; thus he knows his vote is very likely to make a difference. In that case, the self-interested voter may well intend to profit from the way he casts his ballot. Now the objector could main- tain that this instance of self-interested voting is morally wrong, while ordinary self-interested voting is not wrong. But this conclusion of views is implausible. It implies that voters should be told: "It's morally permissible to vote your interest, unless you think your vote is likely to make a difference to the outcome." To this odd sug- gestion, the self-interested voter is apt to respond: "The whole point of voting my interests is to advance my interests."

We have examined several reasons (in addition to the points about causation and contracsts) for thinking vote selling is morally wrong. In each case I have argued that, to the extent it is a good reason, it implies that self-interested voting is morally wrong. Another way to approach the issue is simply to look at possible differences between the two types of action in order to determine whether any of them makes vote selling worse than than self-interested voting. One difference is that the vote seller is not merely motivated by economic gain; he also intends to trade his vote for money, while the self-interested voter cannot intend this, since he knows it is too unlikely his vote will make a difference to the outcome of the election. The self-interested voter at most hopes or wishes to profit from his vote.

to him if his candidate wins will be twenty thousand dollars. (Sup-
pose the election is a small municipal one, and the self-interested
voter is a business owner who would benefit this much from the tax
cut promised by the candidate.) The first voter intended by his vote
to realize a monetary gain, while the second perhaps merely hoped
to do so. But why should this matter morally? Both voters acted
from the same desire to profit, and both actions have the same ex-
pected monetary value.

For all these reasons, it does not appear that the voter's in-
tent to profit makes selling morally worse than self-interested
voting. A second possible difference is that in self-interested voting
the tax cut or subsidy that she enacts in order to keep her promise
will have the effect of benefiting other people, most likely includ-
ing some who did not vote for her. This means voting that is
motivated by self-interest will in fact serve the interests of other
citizens as well. But this point fails to show self-interested voting is
less wrong than vote selling. The voter also may be motivated
by pure self-interest, but if his candidate wins, this will benefit oth-
ers as well, namely all those who have an interest in this candidate's
being elected.

A third and related possible difference is this. The candidate who
appeals to self-interest must make her promises attractive to a wide
range of voters, while the candidate who simply buys votes need
not have any such wide appeal. Thus, it might be said, self-inter-
ested voting is more likely than vote selling to serve the interests of
large numbers of voters. However, this is not so. A voter buying can-
didate who is otherwise unattractive to many voters will need to
buy many votes if she is to have a chance of winning. So in both
cases the candidate will have to spread the benefits fairly
widely. Of course, in some elections a candidate will be able to win
by buying just a few votes. But it is also true that in some elections
a candidate can win by making a narrowly tailored campaign prom-
ise to benefit just a few swing voters.

Fourth, it might be said that self-interested voters receive their
economic benefits from the government, while vote sellers are paid
by private individuals. In fact, however, vote sellers are often paid by
the government on behalf of the party in power.⁸ In any case, even if
the payment for the vote does come from outside the government,
will this support the claim that vote selling is morally worse than
self-interested voting? Compare two cases: in the first, a candidate
promises a certain amount of cash to each homeowner who votes
for her, while in the second the candidate promises to cut every

homeowner's taxes by that amount. Is there reason to think those who voted in order to gain the sum from the candidate's own pockets did something worse than those who voted in order to gain the sum from the general revenue? If anything, it seems the second action may be slightly worse—since the politician planned to use public funds.

Finally, a fifth possible difference is this. When a vote is sold, the payment is usually made prior to the vote counting and independently of whether the candidate who bought the vote wins. By contrast, the self-interested voter receives his benefit (if at all) only after his candidate wins. But does this make self-interested voting less wrong than self-interest? I imagine a type of voting in which the seller is paid after the count and only in the event that the vote buyer wins.⁹ There seems to be no reason to think this vote seller has acted less wrongly than the ordinary vote seller who is paid prior to the count.

As I have acknowledged, there are two distinctions between self-interested voting and vote selling that might make a moral difference:

the vote seller both makes a contract and causes the money to be transferred. We have looked at five other putative moral differences: none of them withstands scrutiny. We also looked at several other reasons for morally condemning vote selling and found that, to the degree they are good reasons, they also condemn self-interested voting. I conclude that the contract and the causal connection are the only two ways in which vote selling may be morally worse than self-voting. I now wish to show that each of these makes vote interested voting. I now wish to show that each of these makes vote selling at most only slightly more wrong than self-interested voting.

First, consider the contract. To what extent does the wrongness of vote selling depend on the fact that the vote seller has entered into a contract? Suppose the candidate distributes cash in exchange for influence (if any) of vote selling depends on the fact that the vote seller has entered into a contract?

Imagine a second kind of case. Suppose the candidate offers (prior to the election) to pay anyone who claims (after the election) to have voted for her. The voter votes for the candidate with the intention of collecting the money, but again he makes no contract. In this case it appears the voter has collected a monetary reward for his vote, but has not actually sold it. Again, some might disagree and say the voter has sold his vote. But the important point is that, regardless of how we label the action, the voter has not entered into a

For these reasons, the existence of a contract does not appear to make vote selling more than slightly worse than self-interested voting. Now I will argue that the point about causation also makes very little moral difference. The argument proceeds as follows. First I will point out that a person who engages in a certain type of attempted vote selling also fails to cause the transference of money. Thus, if the wrongness of vote selling were due in large part to the fact that the voter has cast his ballot for the sole purpose of obtaining the money, but unfortunately for him this purpose is thwarted by the voter's defeat. It is different from some other kinds of attempted vote selling insofar as the voter's ballot casts his ballot for the purpose of profiting for the purpose of profiting. By contrast, in a second sort of attempted vote selling a person attempts to sell his vote by offering to do so and finding no takers. Failing to locate a willing buyer, this would-be voter might simply stay at home on election day, or might go ahead and vote for the candidate of his choice. However, in the first sort of attempted vote selling, the voter actually casts his vote for the candidate who has conditionally offered to buy it.

In what follows I am concerned with the first type of attempted vote selling, and when I use the term "attempted vote selling" I shall be referring to this type. I shall call a person who attempts to sell his vote in this way a "would-be voter seller." Now, unlike the actual and attempted vote selling that money implies, this would-be voter seller might simply stay at home on election day, or might go ahead and vote for the candidate of his choice. However, in the first sort of attempted vote selling, the voter actually casts his vote for the candidate who has conditionally offered to buy it.

In fact, there appears to be very little moral difference between actual and attempted vote selling. In each case a person votes for a certain candidate with the aim of being paid to do so. The actual voter sells his vote to the seller, while the would-be voter sells his vote to the seller. In fact, the two types of selling are morally equivalent.

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it is based on a campaign promise to provide an economic benefit, sure is just as wrong; and (ii) if self-interested voting is wrong when for a candidate is wrong, then self-interested voting for a ballot measure for a candidate is true of the following two claims: (i) if self-interested voting sumes the truth of party affiliation. The argument thus rather than on her record or party affiliation, the candidate's campaign promise to provide an economic benefit, for a candidate rather than for a ballot measure, and it is based on made explicit. The self-interested voting that we have considered is ever, the argument has relied on two assumptions that must now be morally wrong, then self-interested voting is nearly as wrong. However, makes more than a slight moral difference. Thus, if vote selling is voting and vote selling that might matter morally, neither of them I conclude that, of the two differences between self-interested self-interested voting does not matter morally.

In large part to the fact that the actual vote seller causes the transfer follows that the wrongness (if any) of actual vote selling is not due first is morally wrong, the second is nearly as wrong. But then itence between actual vote selling and attempted vote selling: if the selling are on a par. Thus there seems to be very little moral difference. And in that respect attempt vote selling and actual vote corruption of the democratic process rather than in the transfer of money. But the harm in vote selling seems to lie mainly in the fact that someone is killed: this of course is a large part of the harm insignificant difference between murder and attempted murder is the between most other actions versus attempts. One obvious and not vote selling and attempted vote selling seems even smaller than that judgment is generally correct. Still, the moral difference between attempting to do x is somewhat less wrong, and I will assume this thing. Nevertheless, we ordinarily judge that when doing x is wrong, then attempted vote selling is no less wrong than actual vote selling. moral distinction between actions and mere attempts. If it is not, then of "moral luck," it is not clear that it is coherent to draw a tempted murderer is a serious wrong, but it is usually thought not to be as wrong as murderer. As is shown by reflection on the phenomenon that action is generally considered wrong but somewhat less so. At-mad; in all other respects the actions are identical.

If an action is morally wrong, an unsuccessful attempt to perform the same. Imagine someone who votes with the understanding that seems to matter morally, given that each voter's action is otherwise made; in all other respects the actions are identical. the candidate will deposit a sum of money into his bank account if and only if she wins the election. Then the only difference between actual and attempted vote selling is that in the first case the deposit is made; in all other respects the actions are identical.

then self-interested voting is equally wrong when based on other factors such as the candidate's record or party affiliation. Both of these seem true. However, rather than trying to defend them, I will simply point out that either they are true—in which case the fully general conclusion follows (i.e., if vote selling is wrong then self-interest voting is nearly as wrong)—or at least one of them is false—in which case the argument still shows that if vote selling is wrong then self-interest voting for a candidate on the basis of a campaign promise to provide an economic benefit is nearly as wrong.

I have argued that one cannot consistently hold that vote selling is morally wrong and that self-interest voting (for a candidate on the basis of a campaign promise to provide an economic benefit) is morally permissible. To the extent that argument is persuasive, those who do hold both of these propositions are faced with a puzzle. Those who adhere to a Rousseauian account of the purpose of voting tend to be allied with the normative thesis that one ought not to vote in one's own interest. For example, David Estlund argues that a vote should be understood as a statement about the common interest, not as a normative claim about how one ought to vote. But, as Christiano points out, if Estlund's theory is combined with the principle that one should not make false statements, it implies that one ought to vote according to one's judgment of what voting is.

Estlund's theory is intended as an interpretation of what voting is, but vote selling and self-interest voting are wrong.

Both vote selling and self-interest voting are wrong.

Both argument presented in this paper. They can simply accept that the principle of honesty will have no trouble accommodating those who endorse both Estlund's theory of the nature of voting and the principle that one should not make false statements, it implies that one ought to vote according to one's judgment of the common interest.

Those who endorse both Estlund's theory of the nature of voting and the principle of honesty will have no trouble accommodating those who endorse both Estlund's theory of the common interest.

A different approach to the nature of voting understands voting in terms of preferences. Various versions of this theory claim that a vote is either a preference, or an expression of a preference, or a statement about one's preference. Preferences themselves can be understood to be either desires, interests, or dispositions to choose, at least some versions of the preference theory imply that voting one's interests is permissible and perhaps even obligatory. For example, if a vote is simply a preference and the voter's preference is simple, then it would be a contradiction to say a

person voted against his own interest. So this version of the preference theory implies self-interested voting is not only permissible but necessary. Alternatively, if a vote is a statement about one's preference, they desire that their interests be satisfied). Now, if my main concern is correct, such versions of the preference theory imply self-interested voting is morally permissible. This may be surprising, and hence it may be tempting to conclude instead that self-interested voting is not permissible after all, and therefore these versions of the preference theory are incorrect. On the other hand, the cost of accepting the claim that it is morally permissible to sell one's vote may not be quite as high as it initially seems. One can hold that vote selling is morally permissible while at the same time maintaining that it ought to be legally prohibited because of its tendency to produce undemocratic consequences such as an imbalance of political power. Moreover, one can at the same time consistently oppose a legal ban on self-interested voting for the simple reason that it would be impossible to enforce.

We have looked briefly at some possible options for those who wish to maintain either vote selling is morally wrong or self-interested voting is morally permissible. In this paper I take no stand on whether either of these positions is tenable: all I claim is they cannot consist either of held together. On the question of whether one may vote in one's own interest, some would wish to divide the cases and say self-interest is morally permissible in some circumstances but not in others.¹⁵ The argument in this paper suggests that in those circumstances self-interested voting is permissible is cast with mixed motives: the voting may be done partly from self-interest and partly for the common good. My argument suggests that, if it is wrong to sell one's vote, then mixed-motive voting is wrong as well—to the extent that the motive is self-interest. Finally, I have said little about the moral considerations to those raised in this paper would show that if it is morally wrong to buy votes then it is nearly as wrong to make campaign promises intended to appeal to voters' self-interest.¹⁶

3. Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky point out that the agent in the market is *decisive*, while the agent at the ballot box is not *decisive*; they use this difference to argue, against "public choice" theory, that as a matter of empirical fact voting behavior is not motivated by self-interest as market behavior is. See Brennan and洛马斯基, *Democracy and Decision* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). On the other hand, Alvin Goldman argues that "a voter can make a partial causal contribution toward the election of a given candidate even if he is not a swing or decisive voter." See Goldman, "Why Citizens Should Vote: A Causal Responseability Approach," *Social Philosophy and Policy*, vol. 17 (1999), pp. 201-217, p. 203. One of Goldman's arguments draws an analogy with a firing squad: while any single marksman's shot does not make a difference to whether the condemned person dies, the shot is still a partial cause of the death.

4. See Thomas Christiansen, *The Rule of the Many* (Boulder: Westview, 1996); also Allen Buchanan, *Ethics, Efficiency, and the Market* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1985).

5. Anthony Downs (*An Economic Theory of Democracy*) [New York: Harper and Row, 1957], pp. 188-194) attempts to show why this is so. Downs also argues that allowing vote selling is unlikely to be Pareto-optimal, but prohibits it is non-Pareto-optimal as well.

6. For example, Thomas Christiansen ("Freedom, Consensus, and Equality in Collective Decision Making," *Ethics*, vol. 101 [1990], pp. 151-181) suggests the problem with vote selling is that "the cumulative effects would be undesirable for most even though the effect on each individual of her own sale would be beneficial" (p. 178).

7. If Goldmann is correct in claiming voters make a partial causal contribution to the outcome, then voters may intend their actions to make such a partial causal contribution.

8. See "In Mexico, Votes Can Be Bought, Study Shows," *New York Times*, July 31, 1999, p. A4; also "Thailand's Open Walls Bring Fear of a Bougash Presidency," *New York Times*, November 19, 1996, p. A8; cited in Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption and Government* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 138.

9. In Thai elections, vote sellers are sometimes awarded a bonus if the candidate wins. See "Thai Civic: New Leader, but Votes Are Still for Sale," *New York Times*, November 19, 1996, p. A8; cited in Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption and Government* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 99. A more recent theory that general will in itself, he eludes it." *Of the Social Contract*, Book IV, Part I, trans. C. Schrever (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 99.

10. Rousseau is consistent in opposing vote selling along with self-interested voting: "Even in selling his vote for money [the citizen] does not extinguisch the general will in himself; he eludes it." *Of the Social Contract*, Book IV, Part I, trans. C. Schrever (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 99. A more recent theory that general will in itself, he eludes it." *Of the Social Contract*, Book IV, Part I, trans. C. Schrever (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 99.

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- holds voting must aim at the common good is Joshua Cohen's version of deliberative democracy; however, on Cohen's view, voting itself is a second-best procedure to be used only when consensus fails. See Cohen, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," in *The Good Polity*, ed. A. Hamlin and P. Pettit, pp. 17–34 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); and "Procedure and Substantive in Deliberative Democracy," in *Democracy and Difference*, ed. S. Benhabib, pp. 95–119 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).
11. Estlund, "Democracy Without Preference," *Philosophical Review*, vol. 99 (1990), pp. 397–423.
12. Christianso, "Voting and Democracy," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 25 (1995), pp. 395–414, p. 403.
13. See Estlund, "Democracy Without Preference."
14. For that reason, this version of the preference view is not very credible. For other arguments against the view that a vote is simply a preference, see Estlund, "Democracy Without Preference," and Christianso, "Voting and Democracy."
15. See, for example, Christianso, "Voting and Democracy," pp. 406–407.
16. For helpful discussion, many thanks to Bill Edmundson, Peter Limsasy, George Railenbott, and Kit Williamson.