An Ethic of Care
Feminism is not a concept with a single, universally accepted definition. For our purposes, elements of definitions provided by Barbara Bate and by Julia Wood are helpful. Feminism holds that both women and men are complete and important human beings and that societal barriers (typically constructed through language processes) have prevented women from being perceived and treated as valued persons of equal worth with men. Feminism involves commitment to equality and respect for life. Feminism rejects oppression and domination as desirable values and believes that difference need not be equated with inferiority or undesirability. The feminist movement is not a monolithic, unitary social movement. Indeed, Wood describes a number of branches of the feminist movement: radical feminism, middle-class liberal feminism, separatism, structural feminists, lesbian feminists, and womanists.
So, too, with feminist ethics. Alison Jaggar concludes her survey of issues in feminist ethics by noting that "feminist ethics, far from being a rigid orthodoxy, instead is a ferment of ideas and controversy. . . ." In general, however, feminist ethicists offer critiques of male-dominated ethical traditions with special focus on ways in which traditional ethics have functioned to subordinate or trivialize women's ethical experience; rather, the moral experiences of women are worthy of equal respect. Among other things, feminist ethicists question the privileging of rationality over emotion, of universality and detachment over particularity and engagement. of the public sphere of discourse over the private sphere. and of individualism over relationships. Feminist scholars argue the case against sexist language. and some argue for the necessity to slant the truth in order to survive in a male-dominated world.
Feminist ethicists, along with postmodern social critics and some other contemporary ethicists, challenge the standard image of the moral agent in traditional masculine-dominated Western philosophy-the autonomous, unencumbered, individual self impartially deciding ethical questions about abstract others apart from the social, economic, and institutional contexts in which that self is embedded and constructed. Rather, feminist ethicists envision a situated or contextualized self embedded in a web of relationships, roles, and responsibilities, making decisions about concrete, particular persons. Some feminists remind us that gender is only one of a number of important, interrelated, situational variables, such as ethnicity/race, economic/social class, age, marital status, and sexual orientation, that must be considered in building adequate ethical theory and making sensitive ethical decisions.
Traditional male-oriented European-American ethical theories generally have ignored a significant realm of ethical activity-the realm of interpersonal ethics. Traditional ethics has paid scant attention to the moral significance of family and friendship relationships and of emotions such as sympathy, compassion, care, and concern for individual others. Manning reminds us that these are "issues that arise in what is called the private sphere, a sphere that has been seen, in the Western tradition, as the province of women. Men were identified with the public sphere." And Jaggar argues that a key requirement for an adequate feminist ethic is that "it should be equipped to handle moral issues in both the so-called public and private domains."
The concept of a Care Ethic
While acknowledging the diversity and ferment within contemporary feminist ethics, Virginia Held believes that "the ethic of care" is the phrase which is gathering most support as a way of designating an alternative feminist moral outlook. While no label seems adequate yet, "care" seems to come closest, and to contrast well with traditional approaches based on rationality, rules, and the conceptualization of morality in terms of such public or political concerns as justice, liberty, or equality.
We will examine now some of the different versions of an ethic of care that feminists have developed and touch on some of the issues raised by such conceptions.
The first version to be developed, and the one that generated considerable scholarly response, is by developmental psychologist Carol Gilligan. In her book, In a Different Voice, Gilligan critiques the work of others and presents her own research on the sequence or stages of individual human moral development. Gilligan contends that many studies of human moral development, such as the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, generalized the experiences and views of men as adequate to describe moral development for both men and women. With male standards taken as universal, moral judgments made by women frequently are viewed as deficient. In contrast, Gilligan argues that in contemporary North American culture there are two different but valuable and potentially complementary moral "voices" of full adulthood. These male and female voices, while typically manifested in men and women respectively, are modes of thought and themes that could be found either in men or women.
The traditional ethic of justice, according to Gilligan, characterizes the male moral voice. It is rooted in the primacy of individual autonomy and independence. The ethic of justice judges competing rights and embodies a logic of equality and fairness. Reciprocal noninterference with rights describes an individual's obligation. Abstract, universalizable, impartial principles and rules concerning rights and justice are applied to a specific case. An ethic of care, says Gilligan, characterizes the female moral voice. It is rooted in the primacy of actual relationships and the interdependence of self and others. Compassion, empathy, and nurturance help resolve conflicting ethical responsibilities to all concerned, including the self. The ethic of care considers the needs of both self and others, not just the survival of one's self and not just the avoidance of hurting others. Focus is primarily on the concrete circumstances of particular relational situations to guide moral deliberation rather than solely on abstract rules and principles.
In the intervening years, a number of issues relevant to Gilligan's assumptions, research methods, and implications have been debated by feminist and non-feminist scholars from diverse disciplines. Treatments that support, attack, modify, or suggest new avenues are found in books, in anthologies on the topic, and in journal articles. We will examine shortly books by four feminist scholars; each presents her own more or less complete version of an ethic of care.
What are some of the issues that have been and continue to be debated concerning versions of an ethic of care? Here are clusters of some major issues. (1) What grounding or basic assumptions are offered to undergird a care ethic? How is an ethic of care rooted in "natural" capacities common to all humans? To what degree is an ethic of care rooted in biology, maternal experience, cultural construction, or all of these? (2) Must an ethic of justice be essentialized only to men and a care ethic only to women? To what degree can or should the ethics of justice and care be available to both men and women? (3) How do such factors as race/ethnicity, economic/social class, and sexual orientation affect the development and functioning of an ethic of care? Is an ethic of care mostly reflective of the experiences of white, middle-class women? (4) What are some of the central dimensions or characteristics of an ethic of care that might help
Rita Manning presents her version of an ethic of care in her book, Speaking from the Heart: A Feminist Perspective on Ethics. On some points she holds Views similar to Noddings, but on others she differs. Like Noddings, Manning grounds her ethic of care in a type of human nature perspective. Manning believes that "we need not reject conceptions of human nature as providing a foundation for morality" and that "an ethic of care requires a new conception of human nature" that involves "a picture of humans as essentially involved with relationships with other humans." The moral bedrock of the "obligation to care. . . rests on our human capacity for caring interaction." In addition, Manning sees the ethic of care as appropriate for all humans, both women and men, and does not link it to sex and gender. At some length Manning describes her version:
An ethic of care involves morality grounded in relationships and response. When we are committed to an ethic of care, we see ourselves as part of a network of care and our obligation as requiring a caring response to those who share those networks and to those whose need creates an obligation to respond. In responding we do not appeal to abstract principles though we may appeal to rules of thumb; rather we pay attention to the concrete other in his or her real situation. We also pay attention to the effect of our response on the networks of care that sustain us both.
In the care ethic the "importance of intimacy and connection to others is assumed." No one is expendable or simply a vehicle for utility. "Ties of affection. trust. and loyalty matter." Compromise and accommodation are valued in the search for solutions that try to accommodate everyone….(Edited from Johannesen, Richard L. Ethics in Human Communication, 5th ed. Waveland, Press, 2002. p 207ff)
(SEE: Telling it Slant)
Department of Communication, Seton Hall University