Can lying ever be acceptable? Must it always be wrong – a violation of the implied relationship contract necessary for communication, perhaps?

The Enquiring Murderer:

A classic challenge to the absolute requirement of truth was formulated by Swiss philosopher Benjamin Constant, to counter Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative.

If you know where a man is hiding, and a murderer intent on killing him knocks at your door and asks where his prey is, is it acceptable to lie to murderer and say no. Assume that "no comment" is not an option. Do you lie and say you do not know where the person is hiding?

What if the knock at the door is not by a murderer but by someone intent on doing the hiding person some injustice short of murder: threatening him, harassing him, a mob seeking vengeance which you do not expect will result in serious injury. Can you lie to prevent undesirable action short of murder?

The Noble Lie:

Can the greater public good justify a lie "in the public interest" – a "Noble Lie"?

Is a public official justified in lying to the public in order to achieve a policy which, the official seriously believes, will result in the long term greater public good? For example, a candidate who is a proven financial success and is certain he can correct a state’s fiscal crisis, has a plan which will eliminate the debt, stabilize the state’s economy in the long run, and probably result in a lower tax rate in 6-10 years than his opponent’s promises of tax cuts and increased spending. This will almost certainly require short term (1-5 year) tax increases. The financial genius knows that telling the truth about his tax plan will probably lose the election to his fiscally dangerous opponent.

Should he lie and say he will not raise taxes, knowing that he will?

Should he intentionally mislead by confusing the answer, referring to long-term cuts in such a way as to imply that he will not require short term increases?

Should he just tell the whole truth and let the public decide?

The White Lie:

Can lying be judged, at least partially, by immediate effect, making some lies "better" than others if they do less harm? Bok defines a "harmless lie" as "a falsehood not meant to harm anyone and of little moral import." (Bok, 58) These include: the common polite lies - "It’s good to see you"; the false excuse – "I can’t fit that into my schedule" when you simply don’t want to help the person for reasons which might sound rude; and the flattering white lie – "that’s a really great idea" instead of the nasty thing you really think.

We won’t even ask the male dilemma of: "does this make me look fat, dear"

Are white lies really lies?

If so, are they generally acceptable?

Deception as Therapy:

The medical profession is guided by a general principle, "so far as possible, do no harm." Does this principle "transcend the virtue of uttering truth for truth’s sake" (Bok,223) if the truth might do harm? For example, can a medical professional intentionally mislead a patient about the seriousness of an illness if their positive attitude might help them to recover but a panic reaction would might hamper recovery? (See case, Bok, 221)