

Public opinion regarding economic and cultural globalization: evidence from a cross-national survey

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ABSTRACT

Empirical studies of public opinion regarding globalization have to date addressed only economic integration. By way of comparison, we know much less about public opinion regarding cultural globalization. In addition, there has been little head-to-head testing of alternative explanations for public opinions in these areas. I contrast four arguments: skills, partisanship, economic evaluations, and beliefs about the free market, consumerism, and modern life, which I test using survey information taken from 17 developed and developing countries from 2002. I find that values are a powerful and understudied explanation for variations in public opinion. Regardless of whether the question dealt with economic or cultural globalization, views about the free market, consumerism, and modern life had more explanatory power than evaluations of the economy or partisanship, and roughly the same explanatory powers as skill levels. These findings provide important insights into the sources of the globalization backlash and have important implications for how globalization should be both studied and theorized.

KEYWORDS

Globalization; public opinion; culture; trade

INTRODUCTION

Globalization has become the buzzword of the twenty-first century, as well as a booming growth industry for scholarly inquiry. Definitions of the phenomenon are as numerous as speculations about it. Though the concept has many different meanings, empirical studies of public opinion regarding globalization been most extensive in the area of understanding economic integration. While this focus has proven useful to help answer

important questions, we know much less about cultural globalization by way of comparison, and it has also meant that independent variables that may prove helpful in understanding this other facet of globalization have received less attention. Is this disjuncture between what globalization is and how it is studied a danger for future academic inquiry? I argue in the pages later that the answer to this question is a resounding yes. I contrast four arguments to explain variations in public opinion regarding globalization: explanations based on skills, those based on partisanship, those based on evaluations of the economy, and those based on general views about the free market, consumerism, and modern life. In contrast to extant research, I test these explanations using an array of survey questions focusing on both economic and cultural aspects of globalization using 2002 survey data based on respondents across 17 countries. I find that explanations for public opinion based on views about the free market, consumerism, and modern life are as powerful an explanation of opinions on both cultural and economic globalization as differences in skill levels. While this is not surprising for questions of cultural globalization, the fact that these variables are as influential as skills-based accounts raises important questions about how economic integration ought to be studied. These findings both provide important insights about the sources of the globalization backlash as well as point toward a need for more theory addressing interactions between values and interests in survey research.

GLOBALIZATION: WHAT'S IN A WORD?

Held *et al.* (1999: 483) define globalization as 'a process (or set of processes) that embody a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and power'. What is important about this definition is both the focus on different types of process (social, economic, political, cultural) and the focus on transformation. Woods (2000: 2) notes that globalization is more than increases in movements of goods, money, people, and ideas; after all, the notion of transnationalism or interdependence has its roots in liberal IR theory. What's distinct about globalization is its qualitative character: these transactions (and the interactions between different types of transactions) are believed to matter by changing how actors perceive themselves and their interests. Through the deepening integration of markets for money and goods, and through the growing interconnectedness of the world through satellite television and the internet, political relationships within states are being transformed (Holton, 2000; Jacobson, 1996; Soysal, 1994). Protests against the international financial institutions, debates over the necessity of the welfare state, and concerns over the ability of native cultures to keep out pernicious influences can all be thought of in this light.

Some attempts to understand these transformations empirically have employed survey data. Extant studies, however, focus exclusively on economic dependent variables (generally public opinion regarding trade), leaving issues of cultural globalization unexplored. These works can certainly be helpful in deriving hypotheses regarding the determinants of public opinion regarding cultural globalization. As a result, a brief review of the extant literature is essential.

One of the most prevalent approaches to the study of public opinion and trade uses insights taken from standard models of trade preferences. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) test hypotheses derived from the Heckscher–Ohlin model using survey data taken from the United States. The model claims that individuals employed in industries using abundant factors of production gain from free trade. They find that respondent skill levels (measured either through educational attainment or average wages) are important determinants of their views on trade and immigration. High skill workers are more able to benefit from economic integration than low skilled workers, who face greater challenges from imported goods.¹ As a result, these workers are more likely to support immigration and increases in foreign trade than their low-skilled counterparts. Scheve and Slaughter find little support for sectoral explanations for trade preferences (which claim that individual support for free trade is a function of employment in an export-oriented sector). In contrast, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) use a cross-national survey of 23 countries and find support for both the skills-preferences explanation and for sectoral explanations.

Another important variable is partisanship. Against the conventional wisdom, Garrett (1998) finds that left governance and welfare states can readily coexist in a global economy (see also Mosley, 2000). Survey research on trade finds mixed results for any linkage between partisanship and protectionism. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find that conservative respondents were more protectionist in their 1996 survey. Rankin (2001) find that liberal respondents were more favorable to NAFTA. On the other hand, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) found no link between partisanship and trade protection for 1992 data. Similar non-findings on the link between party affiliation and trade preferences were found by Mayda and Rodrik (2005: 11). Previous research indicates that business cycles strongly condition public opinion on economic policy. Studies of the effect of public opinion on economic reform (Duch, 1993; Kaufman and Zuckermann, 1998; Przeworski, 1996; Stokes, 2001) find stronger support for sociotropic explanations than pocketbook explanations.² In other words, evaluations of the overall effects of reform on the economy are more important determinants of respondent opinions than the effects of reform on personal incomes. Similarly, studies of support for European integration also find that sociotropic factors are more important determinants than pocketbook issues (Gabel and Whitten, 1997). A finding that opinions about globalization are shaped largely by

evaluations of the economy would lend support for a business cycle interpretation of opinions. Just as respondents evaluate economic reform as a function of their assessment of the state of the economy, similar dynamics might shape responses to questions regarding globalization.

Finally, existing public opinion surveys of international economic policy also point to value orientations as a factor. Rankin (2001) argues that the low information environment surrounding issues of trade means that beliefs about national identity can be important informational cues to help respondents interpret survey answers. His analysis finds that survey respondents with strong beliefs about patriotism or sovereignty consistently opposed NAFTA. Both Mayda and Rodrik (2005) and O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001) found in their cross-national analysis that respondents that were more nationalistic were more likely to support trade protection. In all three cases, these findings held in the presence of conventional explanatory factors as well as alternative specifications.³

Thus, the question of which explanatory factors account for public opinion regarding globalization is fundamentally important for both theory and practice. First, the cultural face of globalization has not been a focus of public opinion research. We know that with increases in economic interdependence comes challenges to cultures as well (Holton, 2000; Jenkins, 2003), which is reflected in everything from concerns about domestic content of films to attempts to limit citizen access to the internet. States have responded to the removal of trade restrictions by ensuring that cultural industries are exempted (Goff, 2000). We also know that public concerns about the cultural effects of globalization are considerable (Lagos, 2003: 344–5). As an indication of this phenomenon, I report some findings to a survey question asking respondents to evaluate whether access to movies, television, and music from other parts of the world is a good thing for their respective countries. The percentage of respondents answering that access to foreign media was 'very bad' or 'somewhat bad' are reported by country along with the national means in Table 1.

The percentage of negative responses varied widely by country from 7% in Britain and France to 40% for Bolivia. These variations suggest that concerns about cultural globalization are felt by respondents in many countries primarily across the developing world.⁴ This in turn presents an enticing empirical puzzle to explain variations in these responses. It would be a misnomer, however, to suggest that these responses represent majority views of respondents, since the country-level means fall in the 'somewhat good' category for each of the countries in the sample.

How well do extant explanatory variables account for public opinions regarding cultural globalization? We might expect that variables about personal identities would be paramount, but ultimately this question needs to be fought on the empirical battlefield. In addition, following from O'Rourke and Mayda, how can value assessments be integrated into

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Table 1 National-level evaluations of cultural globalization

	Percentage 'very bad' responses	Percentage 'somewhat bad' responses	Question mean (1 = very good, 2 = somewhat good, 3 = somewhat bad, 4 = very bad)
Ivory Coast	1.18	6.48	1.59
South Africa	5.29	8.64	1.63
Venezuela	2.29	9.17	1.64
Great Britain	0.84	6.41	1.65
Turkey	6.52	7.85	1.67
Bulgaria	2.39	11.26	1.73
France	0.9	6.53	1.73
Italy	2.13	10.33	1.86
Mali	3.83	20.85	1.88
Angola	1.66	19.24	1.90
Argentina	4.83	10.8	1.93
Kenya	7.8	19.69	1.99
Brazil	9.33	24.08	2.05
Peru	4.37	22.93	2.18
Bangladesh	9.33	24.08	2.19
Senegal	10.14	22.69	2.21
Bolivia	9.11	31.09	2.41

Question: What about the way movies, TV, and music from different parts of the world are now available in (survey country) – do you think it is a very good thing (1), somewhat good (2), somewhat bad (3), or a very bad thing (4) for our country? Data source: see note 5.

studies about economic globalization? Is it really the case that values help shape answers to survey questions about trade, or are these shaped more by skills or partisanship? To answer this, we need to understand not only which explanatory factors matter, but how much each factor matters.

In terms of policy, answers to the question of sources of opinions brings with it lessons for policymakers in terms of the sources of the globalization backlash and how to craft compensatory policies. If sociotropic or pocket-book explanations account for opinions regarding globalization, this suggests that any backlash is largely short term and tied to national business cycles. Politicians, to the extent this is feasible, should try to reduce opposition by bolstering economic growth. If worker skills best account for variations in opinions regarding globalization, then this suggests the fault lines of globalization are largely class-based, that more attention to policies regarding training or education might be most useful. If partisanship best accounts for variations in opinions, this suggests that we may be able to identify instances in which governments may be less willing to honor international commitments (following Simmons, 1994). Finally, if concerns about globalization are more shaped by value concerns, this implies that governments may have a strong vested interest in tempering the pace of economic integration in order to mute opposition.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND FINDINGS

This paper uses data from the *Pew Global Attitudes Survey*, which conducted a survey of 38,000 respondents in 44 countries over the Summer and Autumn of 2002.⁵ Between 500 and 3,000 respondents were contacted (either face to face or telephone) per country. Not all the questions in the full survey were asked in every country, and in some cases, differences in scaling for variables across countries meant that some variables were not used. Notably, measures of income could not be coded cross-nationally.⁶ In addition, the survey did not ask occupational information. What follows, then, is an analysis based on the available data for the following 17 countries: Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cote d'Ivoire, France, Great Britain, Italy, Kenya, Mali, Peru, Senegal, South Africa, Turkey, and Venezuela. By way of comparison, the survey instrument used in the papers by O'Rourke and Mayda was used in OECD and Eastern European countries. My sample thus includes more developing countries than these other works.

The use of a cross-national survey brings with it several inferential challenges. First, not all the surveys were based on random samples. Thus, the analysis presented here relies on weighted data to ensure that urban respondents were not oversampled relative to rural ones. In addition, the sample is comprised of respondents in many different countries. The within-country observations may be correlated, since respondents within a country might face a common economic shock. If correct, then the standard errors might also be systematically correlated within countries, which would bias the results (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002: 219–20). I address this through a two-fold approach. First, these regression models employ country dummies which control for country-specific factors that are unobserved in the model. In other words, I assume that countries are systematically different, and estimating separate coefficients for each country allows us to assess the extent and direction of this heterogeneity. In addition, the standard errors reported here are clustered by country to address potential within-country correlation. Using both fixed effects and country-clustered standard errors mitigates any potential biases caused by the cross-national research design.

In addition, I employ another test to ensure that a fixed effects model is appropriate for these data. A fixed effects model addresses heterogeneity by constraining the coefficients to be fixed across states. Differences between states are captured by country-specific intercepts. While this is a common approach to addressing heterogeneity across panels, restricting only the intercepts to vary across countries can unduly limit what we can learn about differences across countries. An alternative specification would be to allow the slopes for each country for each variable to vary as well (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002: 220). Such a specification brings with

it the possibility of learning more about the effects of these variables by modeling the heterogeneity in a more complex fashion. For example, a variable-slope model could tell us that the effect of education on public opinion in Brazil is different than its effect in France, and that these differences in turn are separate from the differences in other variables. I created an alternative variable-slope model by creating dummy variables for each of the countries and then multiplying the country dummy times the independent variable in question. Given that we have several thousand observations, this increase in degrees of freedom is not onerous.

Thus, I need to test whether the fixed effects model or the variable-slope model is appropriate. Since the premise behind the variable-slope model is that the interactive slope coefficients are not constant across countries, I test these coefficients using a Wald test. If these interactive slope coefficients are identical for each variable across countries, then a fixed effects model is appropriate. If they are not, then this tells us that a fixed effects model is not ideal for these data. In each of the five models presented later, I report the results of the Wald tests in each of the tables. The test tells us that these coefficients are the same across countries, which supports the use of a fixed effects specification.

There are five dependent variables in this paper. Respondents were asked to evaluate whether communications and travel, and access to movies and television, trade and business ties, globalization, and trade and communications connections were good or bad for their respective countries.⁷ These five survey questions tap differing faces of globalization by focusing on cultural and economic aspects both together and separately. Respondents were asked to assess each issue on a four point scale varying from very good to somewhat good to somewhat bad to very bad. The statistical model used to capture these responses is an ordered probit, which reflects the fact that the dependent variable is based on an ordinal scale.

Our focus is on four sets of independent variables: skills, evaluations of the economy, partisanship, and values.⁸ Following Mayda and Rodrik (2005), we estimate education relative to each country's mean. Thus, respondents were asked what their level of education was, and this score was subtracted from the mean level of education for that country to produce a relative measure of skills. It is worth noting that this is well in line with the logic of Heckscher–Ohlin, which focuses on the abundance of factors of production.⁹ College graduates in Mali, where the mean respondent had only completed primary education, are more highly skilled relative to the population than college graduates in Great Britain, for example. Thus, the tables later report a relative measure of respondent education. Evaluations of the economy represented the respondents' assessment of the future state of the nation's economy in 12 months.

Partisanship was measured by asking respondents to self-place on a left-right continuum using a 10-point scale (in which low values mean

the respondent self identified as left and high values mean the respondent identified as right). One might argue that partisan self-identifications mean very different things across countries, and that asking respondents to self-identify on a left–right scale might serve to mask important distinctions. These sorts of differences are a reason why a fixed effects approach is vital, as it controls for unobserved differences between states. In addition, I include additional questions that are intended to probe respondent attitudes toward the free market at a more specific level.

Responses to four questions were used to tap the symbolic nature of globalization. Respondents were asked if they liked the pace of modern life, felt that consumerism and commercialism were a threat to their culture, and if they felt their traditional way of life was getting lost.¹⁰ In addition, they were asked if they felt that people were generally better off in a free market economy. Taken together, these questions address both the challenge of globalization to tradition and culture as well as deep seated beliefs about the free market. Moreover, these questions can be analytically distinct from issues of partisanship. We can imagine that a respondent might locate herself on the political left, but support a free market economy, and thus support economic integration. This of course will not be the case for all respondents.

We present the findings for questions of cultural globalization first. How can we explain variations in respondent opinions when asked about growing trends in international communication? To assess this, we draw from two survey questions. Respondents were asked to evaluate whether international communication and travel as well as the increasing availability of movies and television from abroad was a good thing for their respective countries. In terms of the research design, this should be a most likely case for cultural factors and a difficult case for economic explanations. In other words, we expect that the symbolic variables to be powerful determinants of responses to questions about cultural globalization.

Evaluations of the economy were significant in both specifications. Respondents with increasingly negative prospective views of the economy had more negative views about communication and travel as well as foreign movies and television. Older respondents tended to be more suspicious of the availability of movies and television. Respondents with relatively higher levels of education were more likely to have positive views of both communication and travel and the availability of movies and television programs. Respondents with higher levels of education are more likely to benefit from globalization, so it should not surprise that they are less likely to view the outside world with skepticism.

In the communication and travel model, both increasingly conservative respondents and those that reported problems buying food were more likely to have negative opinions. In the first case, international communications and travel can corrode deeply held national identities, and in the

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Table 2 Public opinion regarding cultural globalization

	International communication and travel a good thing?	Availability of movies and television a good thing?
Prospective view of economy (increases mean more negative)	0.0651*** (0.0156)	0.0531** (0.0172)
Age	-0.0010 (0.0013)	0.0085** (0.0014)
Unemployed (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.0264 (0.0571)	-0.0402 (0.0508)
Relative education (respondent – country mean)	-0.0520*** (0.0116)	-0.0442*** (0.0114)
Afford food? (1 = yes, 2 = no)	-0.0915** (0.0401)	-0.0585 (0.0480)
Partisanship (increases mean more conservative)	0.0180* (0.0100)	0.0045 (0.0099)
Like pace of modern life (1 = yes, 2 = no)	0.1428*** (0.0408)	0.2801*** (0.0605)
Consumerism a threat (1 = threat, 2 = no threat)	-0.0942** (0.0354)	-0.1248*** (0.0273)
Are people better off in a free market economy (increases mean more disagreement)	0.0890*** (0.0236)	0.0958*** (0.0223)
Traditional way of life (1 = getting lost, 2 = strong)	-0.0486 (0.0521)	-0.1806*** (0.0479)

Ordered Probit Model. Data source: see note 5. Model chi-squared: 0.0000 (for both). Survey-weighted estimations employ country dummies (see Table 5) and robust standard errors clustered by country. Chi-squared test of country dummies: 0.0000 (for both models). Wald test of country slope coefficients: 0.0000 (for both models).

Observations: 8,625 (communication) 8,623 (movies and television).

*0.10 level or better; **0.05 level or better; ***0.001 level or better.

second instance, it can be said that respondents have much more pressing problems. These responses are not surprising, though we would expect these variables to be significant in both models. Partisan differences, however, are only significant at a 0.10 level.

In both models in Table 2, value orientations matter. Respondents that disliked modern life, viewed consumerism as a threat, or had negative opinions of a free market economy were more likely to negatively view cultural globalization. These three variables were highly significant in both models. Respondents that felt their traditional way of life was getting lost had negative opinions of only foreign movies and television.

In terms of our four explanations, we found strong support for a link between skills and support for cultural globalization, limited support for partisanship, strong support for evaluations of the economy, and strong support for values and opposition to cultural globalization. How well do these four factors explain trade? Respondents were also asked to assess whether increasing trade and business ties with the rest of the world was a good thing. It should be noted that this is a different question – focusing

Table 3 Public opinion regarding trade and business ties

Prospective view of economy (increases mean more negative)	0.0757*** (0.0132)
Age	-0.0014 (0.0014)
Unemployed (0 = no, 1 = yes)	-0.0809* (0.0460)
Relative education (respondent – country mean)	-0.0424*** (0.0132)
Afford food? (1 = yes, 2 = no)	-0.0244 (0.0467)
Partisanship (increases mean more conservative)	0.00043 (0.0090)
Like pace of modern life (1 = yes, 2 = no)	0.1135** (0.0480)
Consumerism a threat (1 = threat, 2 = no threat)	-0.1029*** (0.0254)
Are people better off in a free market economy (increases mean more disagreement)	0.1162*** (0.0231)
Traditional way of life (1 = getting lost, 2 = strong)	-0.0161 (0.0550)

Ordered Probit Model. Data source: see note 5. Model chi-squared: 0.0000. Survey-weighted estimations employ country dummies (see Table 5) and robust standard errors clustered by country. Chi-squared test of country dummies: 0.0000. Wald test of country slope coefficients: 0.0000.

Observations: 8,601.

*0.10 level or better; **0.05 level or better; ***0.001 level or better.

purely on the economic face of globalization. This would seem to be a most likely case for evaluations of the economy and skills and a less likely case for values. In other words, we expect that variables capturing respondent values will be less likely to shape responses regarding trade. We now turn to discuss these results (Table 3).

Relative education levels, prospective views of the economy, and views on consumerism and a free market economy are all significant as in Table 2. Comparing these findings to Table 2, we see several differences. Age is no longer significant, and now a respondent's view on whether traditions are under attack had no effect on the respondent's view of trade and business ties. Unemployed respondents have more positive views of trade than employed respondents. This result, while curious, is at the margins of significance. Thus, we see support for all four factors here, which supports the findings of previous research.

What do these results suggest about answers to survey questions regarding globalization? From a definitional standpoint, globalization encompasses both economic and cultural factors. However, these two issues have been the focus of separate questions. What happens when we talk about them jointly? Which explanatory factors are important? To answer this, I estimated the existing set of independent variables on answers to two additional survey questions, asking respondents to evaluate whether globalization or increases in trade and communications were a good thing for their country. I include both questions because globalization was not defined for the respondents. As a result, the responses to this question might reflect different sorts of factors than we would hope to capture with

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Table 4 Public opinion regarding globalization

	Is globalization a good thing?	Are trade and communications connections a good thing?
Prospective view of economy (increases mean more negative)	0.0935** (0.0313)	0.0374** (0.0158)
Age	0.004** (0.0019)	0.0009 (0.0012)
Unemployed (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0.0063 (0.0559)	0.0169 (0.0364)
Relative education (respondent – country mean)	-0.0031 (0.0154)	-0.0421*** (0.0097)
Afford food? (1 = yes, 2 = no)	-0.0874* (0.0490)	-0.0891** (0.0368)
Partisanship (increases mean more conservative)	-0.0206* (0.0114)	0.0175 (0.0108)
Like pace of modern life (1 = yes, 2 = no)	0.1926*** (0.0476)	0.1891*** (0.053)
Consumerism a threat (1 = threat, 2 = no threat)	-0.1454*** (0.0443)	-0.1038*** (0.0289)
Are people better off in a free market economy (increases mean more disagreement)	0.0346* (0.0210)	0.1038*** (0.0220)
Traditional way of life (1 = getting lost, 2 = strong)	-0.1206** (0.0509)	-0.0321 (0.0555)

Ordered Probit Model. Data source: see note 5. Model chi-squared: 0.0000 (for both). Survey-weighted estimations employ country dummies (see Table 5) and robust standard errors clustered by country. Chi-squared test of country dummies: 0.0000 (for both). Wald test of country slope coefficients: 0.0000 (for both models).

Observations: 7,478 (globalization) 8,591 (trade and communication).

*0.10 level or better; **0.05 level or better; ***0.001 level or better.

a question addressing both the economic and cultural faces of integration. These results appear in Table 4.

As in the previous model, evidence supports a link between evaluations of the economy and concerns about values in explaining individual attitudes. Respondents who felt the economy was certain to worsen in the next 12 months were more likely to have negative opinions of globalization and trade and communications connections. In both models, respondents' evaluations of modern life, consumerism, and their views of a free market economy also conditioned their responses. Respondents who had concerns about the pace of modern life, as well as those that thought consumerism was a threat were more likely to view economic globalization negatively. In addition, respondents that disagreed that most were made better off in a free market were more likely to be pessimistic about economic globalization. In both models, respondents that reported difficulties in affording

food were more likely to have negative opinions. As before, these respondents may be blaming international integration for their problems.

Important distinctions are apparent between these two models. Older respondents were more suspicious of globalization, but not of trade and communications connections. Consistent with expectations, those respondents with education levels above the national mean had more positive opinions regarding trade and communications connections. In other words, respondents with relatively stronger skill sets are more positioned to benefit from a globalizing economy. However, there was no significant relationship between skill levels and opinions on globalization, which is in stark contrast to the previous models. The findings on partisanship and globalization are now signed in the opposite from the model in Table 2. In this specification, more liberal correspondents have more negative opinions, not more conservative ones. While this variable is only significant at a 0.10 level, this suggests that the term globalization evokes a range of responses.

Across all of the models presented in Tables 2–4, other specifications of these models were estimated. For example, one recurring finding in studies of public opinion regarding economic questions is a gender gap. Kaufman and Zuckermann (1998) found that women were more likely to support economic reforms in Mexico than men. In contrast, women are less likely to support European integration, free trade, or a single European currency (Banducci *et al.*, 2003; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2001; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). When included in model specifications for each of the five dependent variables, at no point was a gender variable significant. In this survey, we saw no evidence that differences between men and women seemed to affect responses regardless of how the question was posed.

In addition, variables measuring either a respondent's level of satisfaction with their household income or their evaluation of the present state of the economy were only significant in the model for globalization. In the other four models, these variables were not statistically significant. These non-findings support the claim that pocketbook explanations for economic policy choice have little explanatory power, and they further support the notion that even sociotropic evaluations have limited explanatory power.

Finally, the variables in these models are each tapping different issues. While it might seem that partisanship and beliefs about a free market economy are highly collinear, diagnostic tests did not support this claim. The correlation between partisanship and beliefs about a free market economy ranged from a high of 0.262 for respondents in Venezuela to a low of -0.37 for respondents in Bulgaria. This correlation was positive in some countries and negative in others, which suggests collinearity is not an issue. The mean correlation for these two variables was -0.034 for the whole sample, further suggesting these two variables are not strongly connected. Even in the polar cases of Venezuela and Bulgaria, this level of collinearity is not

a threat to inference.¹¹ For the sample as a whole, the Variance Inflation Factor scores for all independent variables were well within acceptable levels, ranging from 1.05 to 2.38. This suggests that the inclusion of several variables designed to tap value concerns did not produce faulty inferences, and that these variables are capturing different concepts.

As noted earlier, each of these five models include country dummies, which control for country-specific factors that shape opinions. In each of these five models, the coefficients were jointly significant, suggesting that a fixed-effects model is the appropriate specification. In order to conserve space, I omitted these coefficients from the tables. What can we learn from these coefficients about differences in opinions across countries? I have summarized the findings for the country coefficients from each of these models in Table 5.

This table summarizes the results for the country coefficients for each of the five regression models. Since we cannot include dummy variables for all the countries, I have omitted Bangladesh here. Thus, these coefficients represent a comparison of country responses relative to that of Bangladesh. One note on interpretation is in order. Given how the dependent variables are coded (with low values meaning 'very good' and high values meaning

Table 5 Summary of country fixed effects

	Communication and travel	Movies and television	Trade and business Ties	Globalization	Trade and communication
Angola	+	-	-	+	+
Argentina	+	-	+	+	+
Bolivia	+	+	+	+	+
Brazil	+	-	+	+	+
Bulgaria	-	-	-	+	+
Ivory Coast	+	-	-	+	-
France	-	-	+	+	+
Great Britain	-	-	+	+	
Italy	+	-	+	+	+
Kenya	-	-	-	-	-
Mali	+	-	-	+	+
Peru	+	+	+	+	+
Senegal	-	+	-	+	-
South Africa	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	-	-	-	+	+
Venezuela	-	-		+	

+Country coefficient positive and significant (meaning higher proportion of 'very bad' responses) at 0.05 level.

-Country coefficient negative and significant (meaning higher proportion of 'very good' responses) at 0.05 level.

Empty cells represent coefficients that are not significant at the 0.05 level.

Bangladesh is the omitted country category.

'very bad' responses), positive coefficients indicate a higher proportion of 'bad' and 'very bad' responses, and negative coefficients on the country dummies indicate a higher proportion of 'good' and 'very good' responses. All distinctions discussed later are based on country coefficients that are significant at the 0.05 level or better.

One finding jumps out from Table 5: there are countries that view international integration consistently negatively regardless of which question is asked. Similarly, there are countries which view integration consistently positively regardless of question. This first group includes Bolivia and Peru, and the second includes Kenya and South Africa. Understanding why these differences exist is left for future research, but an initial hunch is that the populist histories of these Latin American cases may play an important role in explaining the across-the-board negative responses for Bolivia and Peru.

In the model for communication and travel, there are eight countries in which the country mean reflects greater pessimism (Angola, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ivory Coast, Italy, Mali, and Peru). On the other hand, there are eight countries in which respondents have a more positive view of the effects of international communication and travel (Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Turkey, and Venezuela). Both wealthy and poor countries appear in both groups. In contrast, in the model for opinions regarding availability of movies and television from other countries, opinions were more highly favorable across countries, as the country coefficients were significant for every country save Bolivia, Peru, and Senegal, where these coefficients were negative. The differences in responses between these two questions was surprising given the concerns noted earlier about the threat that globalization poses to cultural identities. In this instance, it could be that respondents to the second question merely viewed the matter in terms of personal choice in that they now have more options to access international media. In this sense, concerns about the effect of international ties on cultural integrity are less salient.

Turning to the model for trade and business ties, the results for the country coefficients were more ambiguous. Here there were seven countries in which respondents were more suspicious of the effects of trade (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Peru) and eight that had positive views (Angola, Bulgaria, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, South Africa, and Turkey). Comparing these two groups, it seems that respondents from wealthy countries were more likely to be negative and respondents from poorer countries were more likely positive. It is no accident that Latin American countries have more negative opinions of trade, given the economic crises that gripped Argentina and Brazil in 2001. The three high income countries also had more negative opinions of foreign trade as well, which could reflect concerns about competing with low-cost labor from abroad. Lower income countries had more positive views of the

effects of international trade on their economies, which could also reflect a relative abundance of cheap labor. These results suggest that the backlash against global trade, at least in the views of citizens, is stemming more from the developed world than the developing world.

Country coefficients for the fourth question on globalization and the fifth question on trade and communication were overwhelmingly negative. Only respondents in Kenya and South Africa were more likely to view globalization as a good thing for their respective countries; in every other country evaluations of globalization were more negative. This question invites further research. Because the term globalization was not defined for respondents, it is not clear what sorts of cues respondents might have been drawing on. Regarding the question on trade and communication, only respondents in four countries (Ivory Coast, Kenya, Senegal, and South Africa) were more likely to have positive assessments of the benefits of foreign trade and communication on their respective countries. The remaining countries were more likely to have negative views on this question.

While analyzing the country coefficients can help us understand how country-level factors affect opinions, they cannot by themselves help us to understand the size of the effects produced by the other independent variables. This is the subject of the next section.

COMPARISON OF SUBSTANTIVE EFFECTS

Mere findings of statistical significance tell us nothing about the size of an independent variable's effect on a dependent variable. Given that several types of explanations seemed to account for respondent choices, which of these factors mattered more? Because a probit model is nonlinear, we cannot merely compare the size of the coefficients. To answer this question, I generated predicted probabilities for all five dependent variables across values of the dependent variable. In other words, I used the regression results to generate an estimate of the probability that a respondent would answer a question very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad. Next, I then calculated the change in these predicted probabilities for changing education, partisanship, economic variables, and value variables, respectively, from their mean values to their maximum values. This tells us about the relative influence of each factor, and we can compare influence across models by looking at these probabilities. These probabilities are reported in Table 6.

For each dependent variable, I generated a baseline probability of answering the question by assuming that an average respondent would have values of all independent variables set at the sample mean.¹² These baselines suggest that respondents were likely to have positive evaluations of globalization, as the percentage of positive responses (the sum of very good

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Table 6 Changes in predicted probabilities

	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad
Communications				
Baseline	44.44%	49.88%	4.66%	1.02%
Relative education ¹	12.46%	-9.68%	-2.19%	-0.6%
Partisanship ²	-3.45%	2.38%	0.81%	0.26%
Economic ³	-6.87%	4.57%	1.72%	0.59%
Values ⁴	-11.52%	7.17%	3.18%	1.17%
Movies and TV				
Baseline	32.85%	49.67%	14.16%	3.31%
Relative education	10.13%	-4.11%	-4.47%	-1.54%
Partisanship	-0.78%	-0.22%	0.41%	0.17%
Economic	-2.93%	0.71%	1.56%	0.66%
Values	-13.89%	-0.52%	8.63%	4.75%
Trade				
Baseline	41.91%	49.76%	6.43%	1.90%
Relative education	10.17%	-6.89%	-2.36%	-0.91%
Partisanship	-0.08%	0.05%	0.02%	0.01%
Economic	-3.62%	2.07%	1.06%	0.49%
Values	-12.33%	6.00%	4.16%	2.17%
Globalization				
Baseline	23.06%	55.06%	15.15%	5.89%
Relative education	0.57%	0.8%	-0.32%	-0.21%
Partisanship	3.17%	0.45%	-1.69%	-1.09%
Economic	-6.19%	-0.77%	3.87%	3.09%
Values	-7.51%	-0.47%	4.81%	4.01%
Trade and communications				
Baseline	46.16%	47.31%	5.05%	1.49%
Relative education	10.11%	-7.46%	-1.94%	-0.73%
Partisanship	-3.38%	2.22%	0.81%	0.35%
Economic	-4.07%	2.66%	0.98%	0.43%
Values	-13.72%	7.79%	3.93%	1.99%

Baseline probabilities calculated for mean value of all independent variables (including country dummies). Entries in boldface are significant changes in probabilities at a 0.05 level or better.

¹Change in probability caused by moving from country education mean to most educated relative to country mean.

²Change in probability caused by moving from mean partisanship score to maximum value (far right).

³Change in probability caused by moving Change in Economy from mean to Worsen a Lot and moving from Employed to Unemployed.

⁴Change in probability caused by moving Free Market from mean to Completely Disagree, Like Modern Life from mean to Do Not Like, Consumerism from mean to A Threat, and Traditional Way of Life from mean to Getting Lost.

and good responses) outweighs the percentage of negative responses (the sum of bad and very bad responses) for every single question. This raises a broader question: where is the opposition to globalization coming from?

Fortunately, we can estimate this from each model by changing the independent variables to help answer this question. For each of the five survey questions, I generated four predicted probabilities. In the first (listed as Relative education in Table 6), I changed a respondent's relative education level from the country mean to the maximum (the farthest distance from the country mean), which corresponded with having a postgraduate degree. In the second (listed as Partisanship), I held all other variables at their means and moved the respondent's partisanship score from the sample mean to the far right. In the third (listed as Economic), I generated the probability of answering each survey question at each of the four levels by making a respondent unemployed and by moving their future evaluation of the economy from the mean level (About the Same) to its maximum level (Likely to Worsen Substantially). Finally, I took the four values questions (free market, like modern life, consumerism, and traditional way of life) and moved them from their mean values to their maximum values (corresponding, respectively, to strongly disagree that most are better off under the free market, dislike modern life, view consumerism as a threat, and feel traditional way of life is getting lost). This allows us to test the explanatory power of these three explanations in a head-to-head fashion, with the goal of understanding which factors are most important.

Four key findings emerge from Table 6. First, values issues are an important factor in explaining how respondents assess globalization. As respondents became more resentful of modern life, more suspicious of consumerism and the free market, and believe that their traditional way of life is disappearing, they are consistently more likely to have negative opinions of globalization, regardless of whether we are talking about economic or cultural globalization. For each of the five dependent variables, changing responses to values questions reduced the percentage of positive answers and increased the percentage of negative answers. In ten instances, these changes were statistically significant at a 0.05 level or better. It is worth stressing that values mattered regardless of how the question was phrased. Even when the question was explicitly about trade, attitudes toward the free market mattered. It is also worth stressing that these probabilities were generated by holding all other variables at their mean values. Controlling for other factors, therefore, a respondent's orientation toward the free market, consumerism, and modernity strongly condition evaluations of globalization.

The magnitudes of these changes in probabilities reveal that value concerns are as important as skills. In each of the panels in Table 6, the size of the changes in probabilities is substantial, and the changes in response to values issues rival those of other explanations. In the question

on globalization, changes in values were significant for 'very good' and 'somewhat bad' at a 0.10 level. No other variables were significant at 0.10 for any other cell for that question.

Relative education levels turned out to be another important factor. Our relative education measure was significant in 11 instances, and the magnitude of the change in probability is roughly equivalent to changes in values. More educated respondents were more likely to have more positive opinions regarding globalization in either economic or cultural senses. More educated respondents are more likely to regard increases in foreign trade as 'very good'. In addition, these respondents are not deterred by cultural globalization as well; they are more likely to regard increases in international communication as 'very good' and less likely to have negative opinions regarding increasing access to foreign movies and television programs.

Changing evaluations of the state of the national economy is a less important determinant of respondent attitudes. Changes in this variable produce statistically significant changes in probability in only two instances. Here, we changed a hypothetical respondent from employed to unemployed, and worsened their evaluation of the economy over the next 12 months. This served to reduce the percentage of positive responses and increase the percentage of negative responses. However, two caveats are worth noting. The magnitudes of these changes in probabilities are lower for economic variables than for either value or skill variables. That is, they are less powerful determinants of responses. In addition, the economic variables are only significant in changing response probabilities for the communications model.

Finally, partisanship was the least important factor, as it was not significant at the 0.05 level in a single case. While not significant, the variable was signed differently across the models in Table 6. For communication and trade, more conservative respondents were opposed. For globalization, more liberal respondents were more likely to oppose. This finding resembles those of earlier studies which found that partisanship did not correlate in a consistent manner with views about foreign trade. Partisanship in this paper is a very imperfect proxy for beliefs about the merits of markets and the importance of redistribution. Thus, it is no wonder that it is rarely a significant determinant of attitudes regarding globalization.

IMPLICATIONS

The findings here offer a number of important lessons for further research. First, there is an important need to consider both economic and cultural faces of globalization as dependent variables. First, given trends in both economic integration and international communication, understanding the determinants of attitudes in both areas is important. More importantly, it's clear that independent variables from both value and interest-based

approaches should be a focus of further empirical research as well as theorizing. We found that value orientations help explain survey responses to questions about economic integration. Thus, cultural variables have important explanatory power even in this less likely case.

This raises the important question of why these findings emerged from the data. Put another way, why do values matter? One possibility suggested by Rankin (2001) is that value concerns can be important in public opinion regarding international economic choices because they serve as information shortcuts. Survey respondents might not know all the nuances of the distributional effects of international trade, but they can answer questions because international trade (and the consumerism it engenders) threatens to dislocate them. We need more research to understand the process by which people form opinions about international integration.

In addition, these findings challenge the notion of a globalization backlash both empirically and theoretically. In no instance in the results presented here did we see majority negative responses to questions about economic or cultural globalization. In terms of its sources, the research here points to two useful correctives to the conventional wisdom. First, opposition to globalization is not based on left–right distinctions. Not only is it the case that opinions regarding the free market matter, but also that these evaluations of the free market are significant even after we control for an individual’s placement on a left–right continuum. Second, the data in Table 5 tells that there are important variations in survey responses by country. While the fixed effects model essentially treats country dummies as a nuisance, we need to better understand why these variations exist cross-nationally. These findings suggest that differences between countries are not merely based on the divide between rich and poor countries.

These findings suggest that more research is necessary on both the theoretical and empirical fronts to unpack the sources of citizen attitudes regarding globalization. Not only is there a need for better data, but there’s a need for better theory in order to help us understand how skills and value orientations matter. The stakes are very high indeed.

NOTES

- 1 This finding has been supported in other contexts. In the literature on European integration, Gabel and Whitten (1997) and Banducci *et al.* (2003) find that education is positively related to support for European integration as well as for a single European currency, respectively. Studies of economic reform find that more educated respondents were more likely to support reform in Russia and Poland (Duch, 1993; Przeworski, 1996).
- 2 These findings mirror those in the American and comparative literatures (Fiorina, 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 1988).
- 3 The idea that economic integration can be framed in terms of a challenge to existing political communities and identities is not new. As Cohen (2001: 160)

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- notes, 'globalization inevitably challenges some of the fundamental values, narratives, and symbols that have held communities together'.
- 4 The means between responses showed more pessimism in developing countries than in developed ones. The mean across developing countries was 1.95, and the mean for OECD members was 1.73.
 - 5 The results of the survey are available at <http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/165.pdf>, and the codebook and data are available at <http://people-press.org/dataarchive/>. The Pew Global Attitudes Project bears no responsibility for the analyses or interpretations of the data presented here.
 - 6 Not only were the scales of incomes incommensurable across countries, but surveys for some countries used annual data and others used monthly data. These two factors combined with disparities in purchasing power across countries mean that this variable had to remain omitted.
 - 7 Terms such as globalization were not defined for the respondents.
 - 8 The appendix contains a list of survey questions used.
 - 9 Applications that use this framework (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2001; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001) assume that the labor is the key factor of production, and differing endowments (cross-nationally) of different levels of labor skills account for trade preferences. For example, given that Mexico is abundant in unskilled labor, unskilled Mexican workers should favor free trade, as free trade increases demand for the goods that unskilled labor produce (following O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2001: 161). Thus, Mexican workers with education levels above the national mean should oppose free trade, and those with education levels at or below the national mean should support it.
 - 10 Consumerism and commercialism were defined as 'the products and ways of doing business of large companies'.
 - 11 The mean Variance Inflation Factors on country-only samples were 1.26 for Bulgaria and 1.07 for Venezuela.
 - 12 The country dummies are set at means as well.

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APPENDIX: QUESTIONS

Dependent variables:

Communication and travel: And what about the faster communication and greater travel between (survey country) and other countries – do you think it is a very good thing (1), somewhat good (2), somewhat bad (3), or a very bad thing (4) for our country?

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Availability of movies and television: What about the way movies, TV, and music from different parts of the world are now available in (survey country) – do you think it is a very good thing (1), somewhat good (2), somewhat bad (3), or a very bad thing (4) for our country?

Trade and business ties: What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between (survey country) and other countries – do you think it is a very good thing (1), somewhat good (2), somewhat bad (3), or a very bad thing (4) for our country?

Globalization: There has been a lot of talk about globalization these days. Do you think that globalization is a very good thing (1), somewhat good (2), somewhat bad (3), or a very bad thing (4)?

Trade and communication: All in all, how do you feel about the world becoming more connected through greater economic trade and faster communication – do you think this is a very good thing (1), somewhat good (2), somewhat bad (3), or a very bad thing (4) for our country?

Independent variables:

Change in economy: Over the next 12 months, do you expect the economic situation in our country to improve a lot (1), improve a little (2), remain the same (3), worsen a little (4), or worsen a lot (5)?

Age: How old were you at your last birthday? (Range: 18–97)

Unemployment: What is your current employment situation? (Dummy variable created from all those who self identified as unemployed=1, employed=0).

Education: What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (Responses on nine-point scale: No formal education (1), Incomplete primary education (2), Complete primary education (3), Incomplete secondary education (vocational school) (4), Complete secondary education (vocational school) (5), Incomplete secondary education (preparatory school) (6), Complete secondary education (preparatory school) (7), Some university (8), University graduate (9). Note that the variable reported in the results (Relative Education) is the difference between the respondent's education level and the country mean.

Afford food: Have there been times during the past year when you did not have enough money to buy food your family needed? (1 = Yes, 2 = No).

Partisanship: Some people talk about politics in terms of left, center, and right. On a 10-point scale, with 1 indicating extreme left and 10 indicating extreme right, where would you place yourself? (Range: 1 = Far Left, 10 = Far Right).

Like modern life: Which of the following comes closer to your view: I like the pace of modern life, OR I do not like the pace of modern life? (1 = Like, 2 = Do not like)

Consumerism: Which of the following comes closer to your view: Consumerism and commercialism are a threat to our culture, OR consumerism and commercialism are not a threat to our culture? (1 = Threat, 2 = No Threat)

Free market economy: Please tell me whether you completely agree (1), mostly agree (2), mostly disagree (3) or completely disagree (4) with the following statement: 'Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor'.

Traditional way of life: Which of these comes closer to your view? Our traditional way of life is getting lost (1), OR our traditional way of life remains strong (2).