IMF-Related Research
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IMF-Related Research

My research addresses how we evaluate the effects of IMF lending programs, how we appraise recent changes to IMF conditionality, and how we assess the day to day work of the IMF in surveillance.

Transparency and the Value of International Monetary Fund Surveillance.

While we understand a great deal about IMF lending, we know very little about how the day-to-day process of IMF surveillance of country economies actually works. Supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, I plan to investigate country decisions for transparency, the content of surveillance reports, and assess the impact of transparency on the behavior of financial markets. More information on the project appears below, including preliminary findings from the first and second phases of this project, which were presented at the Midwest Political Science Association meeting in Spring 2011 and Spring 2012.

Award Notice and Project Summary
NSF Project Description
Phase One Findings Paper (Paper Version: 5/22/11)
Phase Two Findings Paper (Paper Version: 4/6/12)
More Preliminary Findings

A Brief Evaluation of the 2011 Triennial Surveillance Review.

I recently wrote a short paper for the New Rules for Global Finance Coalition looking at the IMF's recent review of surveillance. Rather than evaluate 14 discrete papers, I summarize some of the key findings and offer some recommendations moving forward.
Under the Microscope: Some Findings from the 2011 Triennial Surveillance Review

The Effects of International Monetary Fund Programs on Capital Markets.

The conventional wisdom is that IMF programs do not function as a "seal of approval" to international capital markets. In a pair of published papers, I assess this relationship by focusing on flows of portfolio investment (which is the type of investment flow most likely to respond to the announcement of an IMF program). These papers suggest that markets respond to IMF programs as a "one-way signal;" those states with suspended programs experience capital flight. Good performance, on the other hand, is not rewarded by international capital markets.

Is Non-Compliance Costly? Investor Responses to IMF Program Failures (Published in Social Science Quarterly)
Signalling Credibility? The IMF and Catalytic Finance (Published in Journal of International Relations and Development)

Public Commentary on the IMF and Conditionality Reform.

My op-eds on the Fund appear below:

Commentary in World Politics Review June 2011
Commentary in World Policy Blog June 2011
Commentary in China-US Focus June 2011

Commentary in Foreign Policy in Focus September 2009
Reply to Soren Ambrose of Action Aid International in Foreign Policy in Focus September 2009
Commentary in World Politics Review May 2009
Commentary in Foreign Policy April 2009
The International Monetary Fund, Conditionality, and the World Economic Crisis: New Beginning or False Dawn?